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ABSTRACT

Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 to
address serious deficiencies in the ba.nkruptcy system.

The

previous system was criticized for appearances of

impropriety in bankruptcy proceedings, lack of creditor
control over administration of cases, and the court's joint

administrative and adjudicative functions.

The United

States Trustee program was created by Congress to address
these issues by providing administrative and oversight
functions in the bankruptcy system.

This paper analyzes the

effectiveness of the program by conducting a review of the
substance of the Bankruptcy Act and an examination of the

Bankruptcy Code

to determine if the problems it sought to

correct are continuing.

The United States Trustee program

is found to be effective and has achieved its program

objectives.

Conclusions and recommendations are made to

further strengthen the program and bankruptcy system.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution

grants authority to the federal gpvernment to make uniform
laws on the subject of bankruptcy.

Pursuant to this

authority. Congress had regulated bankruptcies in the United
States through a succession of statutes until 1978, when it
enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 (BRA).

The BRA has five bankruptcy chapters:

Chapter 7

(liquidation); chapter 9 (municipal); chapter 11 (business

reorganization); chapter 12 (family farmer reorganization);
and chapter 13 (individual reorganization).

An appointed

trustee in chapter 7 cases administers any assets for the
benefit of creditors.

Chapters 11, 12, and 13, require the

debtor to submit a "plan" to repay creditors, over a period
of time, all or a portion of the creditor's claim.

Although bankruptcy is intended to give the debtor a

"fresh start," the effect is generally detrimental to
creditors, particularly creditors of "no-asset" chapter 7
debtors wherein a general discharge of debts is granted and
the creditors receive no monies.

Prior to the BRA, all administrative as well as

judicial functions in bankruptcy were handled by the

bankruptcy courts.

The administrative functions in

bankruptcy cases include the following:

ensuring payment of

withholding and other taxes by bankrupt debtors, organizing
and scheduling meetings of creditors, organizing creditor

committees, appointing private trustees in chapter 7
liquidation and chapter 13 wage-earner cases, monitoring the
filing of reports and schedules, and monitoring cases for
signs of fraud and abuse.

Judicial functions were generally

limited to rulings by judges on disputed matters in

adversary proceedings and on other filings for which court
approval is required.
The conflictive nature of handling both administrative
and judicial functions by the bankruptcy courts caused
public confidence in the system to wane.

An awkward

relationship between trustees and their appointing judges
created an appearance of favoritism, cronyism and bias.
The BRA created the United States Trustee (UST) pilot

program and housed it in the executive branch within the
Department of Justice (DOJ).

The purpose of the program was

to separate the administrative duties from the judicial
functions in the bankruptcy system.

The pilot program

originally was to run through 1984 but was extended to 1986.

As part of the legislation establishing the pilot

program. Congress mandated that a formal eyaluation of it be
conducted and a formal recommendation was to be made by the

Attorney General conGferning the desitability of nationwide

This paper will analyze the effectiveness of the UST

program under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.

This will

be accomplished by considering prior studies and reviewing
major parts of the program.

A review of the substance of

the Bankruptcy Act and an examination of the Bankruptcy Code

will be conducted to determine if the problems it sought to

correct are continuing.

Recommendations will be made as

necessary or appropriate.

CHAPTER II

HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY ADMINISTRATION

Introduction

The current bankruptcy system was established by the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 during the early years of consumer

and commercial credit and was designed primarily to handle

business casesJ

The rise in consumer credit after World

War II brought a corresponding increase in the number of
consumer bankruptcy cases.

District judges referred bankruptcy cases to

"referees," who were appointed to two year terms and paid on
a commission basis.

The judicial role of the referee was

minor; most litigation was handled by federal district or
state courts.
administrator.

They were perceived to be a supervisor or
Three types of matters were decided by

referees: (1) those relating to property over which they had
direct control; (2) those referred to them as special

''Three other "Bankruptcy Acts" preceded the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898: (1) The Bankruptcy Act of 1800 (repealed in
1803) allowed involuntary bankruptcy proceedings against
merchants; (2) the Bankruptcv Act of 1841 (repealed in 1843)
allowed voluntary or involuntary proceedings against
merchants or individuals; (3) the Bankruptcy Act of 1867

(repealed in 1878) allowed corporations to file bankruptcy.

masters by district judges; (3) those submitted to them by
consent of the parties.
The Chandler Act of 1938 and subsequent legislation

gave the referee increasing judicial responsibilities and
powers, and transferred many administrative duties to a
trustee or clerk,

in 1946, referees were made salaried

officers of the district courts and their term of office was

extended to six years.

By legislation enacted in 1966,

referees were prohibited from acting as trustees or
receivers in bankruptcy cases.

in 1973, on the recommendation of the Judicial
Conference, the title "referee" was changed to "bankruptcy

judge.

This distinctipn recognized bankruptcy judges as

official judicial officers who handle only bankruptcy cases;

bankruptcy courts became a specialized court within the
district court system.

The district judges, then, became

less involved with the administration and decision-making in

bankruptcy cases, which they considered to be too

specialized to be handled on a generalist basis.

The only

control district judges still retained was in the

appointment and removal of bankruptcy judge process, in

^Advisory Committee's [on Bankruptcy Rules established in
1960 pursuant to 28 U.S. Code, sec. 331] Introductory Notes
to the Preliminary Draft [of the Bankruptcy Rules and Official
Forms promulgated in 1973], contained in 1976 Collier Pamphlet
Edition. Bankruotcv Act and Rules. Part 2 Bankruptcy Rules,

edited by Lawrence P. King, Asa S. Herzog, and William T.
Laube. (New York: Mathew Bender, 1976), p. 753.

hearing appeals of bankruptcy court decisions,^ and in the
exercise of certain powers reserved to the district courts
by statute.

Prior to the BRA, bankruptcy judges administered the

bankruptcy system including individual bankruptcy cases.
These administrative, supervisory and clerical functions
were in addition to their judicial duties.

In contrast to

most civil litigation, where case administration and

supervision is handled by the litigants, the judge in a

bankruptcy case takes an active role in the supervision of
cases.

In bankruptcy cases there is a definite public

interest in this method of administration due to the

potential for fraud, self-dealing, and diversion of funds.^
Additionally, bankruptcy cases have the potential for

affecting hundreds of creditors, thereby necessitating the
active supervision by an impartial person.

The Bankruptcv

^While district court generally retains the power to hear
bankruptcy appeals, an intermediate appeals court has been
established (Bankruptcy Appellate Panel) which, unless an
objection to jurisdiction has been filed by the parties, may
hear appeals from the bankruptcy court. If an objection is
filed, then the appeal is transferred for hearing to district
court. "The judicial council of a circuit may establish a

bankruptcy appellate panel, comprised of bankruptcy judges
from districts within the circuit, to hear and determine, upon

the consent of all the parties, appeals under subsection (a)
of this section." Bankruptcv Reform Act. U.S. Code, 28, sec.
158(b)(1).

^U.S., Congress, House, Hearings on H. Rept. 31 and
H. Rept. 32 before the Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary.
94th Cong., 1st and 2d sess., 1975-76, pt. 1, pp. 99-101.

Act of 1898 (Act) was designed so that creditors had control

over the "bankrupt's"^ estate,^ which theoretically belbnged
to them.

Under the Act, creditors elected a "trustee" tb

oversee the assets for the benefit of the creditors.

They

were also permitted to elect a committee to represent them
in matters pertaining to the administration of the case as

well as in the supervision of the trustee,

in reality,

however, creditor control existed only in the largest cases

and trustee supervision was done by bankruptcy judges.

In

cases where the creditors refused to exercise their

supervisory powers, the judge was forced to do so by

appointing a trustee.

The judge supervised the trustees and

advised them on legal methods to recover assets, reviewed

most of the trustee's transactions, and ruled "ex parte"^ on
their propriety.

Additionally, the judge presided at the

first meeting of creditors and supervised the examinations

® The term "bankrupt," denoting the person(s) who filed
bankruptcy, was changed to "debtor" with the enactment of the
Bankruptcv Reform Act of 1978.

^ The term "estate" is synonymous with "assets" of the
person who has filed bankruptcy. The "estate" or "assets" of
a debtor come under the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court
and are subject to distribution to creditors under the
supervision of the court, generally through a trustee
appointed by the creditors or by the court.

^"Ex

parte"

is

defined

as

an

oral

or

written

communication between the court and a party in interest to an
action (the trustee in this instance) which is not made on the
public record and to which reasonable prior notice to all
parties has not been given.

of the debtors (similar to depositions) which were conducted

by the trustee and creditors to obtain information regarding
the debtor and the estate.

In 1973, the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the

United States (Bankruptcy Commission) recommended
legislation that was introduced in both houses of Congress.

The legislation would separate administrative and

adjudicative functions:

a bankruptcy court (judicial) and

an executive agency (administrative) to be called the United
States Bankruptcy Administration.
The National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges drafted an

alternative bill that proposed the transfer of non-judicial
or administrative duties to bankruptcy clerks and to the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO).

The

National Bankruptcy Conference drafted a third bill that
combined elements of the bills recommended by the Bankruptcy
Commission and the National Conference of Bankruptcy Judges.

After 3 years of hearings, the Bankruptcv Reform Act of 1978

was passed.®

The UST program was created as a result of

this compromise; it provided that it be instituted as a

pilot program under the supervision of the Attorney General.

®The substantive portion of the Act is Title I, also
known as the Bankruptcv Code.

Problems Before the United States Trustee Program

Inconsistencies between the judicial and administrative

roles of bankruptcy judges placed them in a position of

conflict.

Specifically questioned was their ability to act

impartially in disputes between the estate and third
parties.

The trustee, an appointee of the bankruptcy judge,
represented the estate.

The same trustee also may have

represented many other estates before the same judge who
also appointed him to other cases.

A close working

relationship generally ensued with frequent "ex parte"
contacts between the two in the administration of the case.

The appearance of impartiality was thus impugned.
Information obtained during an examination of the

debtor at the first meeting of creditors, over which the
bankruptcy judge presided, may then have been used in
actions later filed by the trustee on the advice of the

judge.

The judge became an "interested party" and therefore

biased about a case.

Creditor control of estates, as envisioned by the
framers of the Act, was in reality a myth.

The asset case

was controlled, not by creditors, but by attorneys; the
bankruptcy system operating more for the benefit of

attorneys than for the benefit of creditors.

The attorneys

solicited and obtained proxies from creditors and thus
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gained control over the supervision of the case and assets.

In areas where trustees were appointed by the judges, the
trustee also administered the cases.

Again, the

relationship between the trustee and the judge was
questioned.

Fee generation was another problem.

The Act's

administrative system provided for trustee compensation in
the form of fees to be collected from an estate as an

incentive for trustees to collect assets for the estate.

If

the trustee also served as receiver, additional fees were
received even if the work done was part of the work of the

trustee.

Legislation allowed a fee structure, which was

abused, and further allowed the trustee to receive most if
not all of the monies from the estate while the creditors

received nothing.

The assets were applied to the trustee's

fee, his attorney's fee, and the required contribution to
the Referees Salary and Expense Fund.

The general practices grow from the relationship
between the trustees and the bankruptcy judges.
The Bankruptcy Act permits election of trustees by
creditors. Creditors seldom take an interest in
consumer cases, however, and thus the bankruptcy

judges appoint their friends as trustees in the
Vast majority of cases. Thus, litigants and
observers frequently object to the apparent, and
in many cases real, Oronyism between bankruptcy
judges and their trustees. The "bankruptcy ring"
is reflected not only in the appearance of
unfairness in bankruptcy judges ruling in

litigation between their appointees and third
parties, but also in the awarding of compensation

by the appointing authority. The judges protect
their appointees, mostly through use of the $150

10

disGretlonary fee, to the detriment of both the

9

debtor's fresh start and the creditors' recovery.

Last, there was a problem related to the relationship

between bankruptcy judges and the bankruptcy bar, especially
attorneys representing debtors and trustees.

The multitude

of contacts between these led to a consensus among non-

bankruptcy attorneys that there was a "bankruptcy ring" that
had ah inside track on all bankruptcy matters, including

judicial favoritism.

This was reported by Harold Marsh,

Chairman of the Bankruptcy Commission in hearings before the
Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights:
As a result of the nature of the system itself,
there exists a relationship between the Bankruptcy
Judges, the trustees and the counsel for the
trustees which many people, including many
involved in the system, consider unhealthy from

the point of view of proper judicial and
governmental administration. The judges by and
large appoint the trustees and thereby in effect
select the counsel. They do not generally appoint
persons who are total strangers to them, and it
would be entirely unrealistic to expect that they
would or should.

These same trustees and lawyers

then deal on a day-to-day basis with the judge
regarding the routine conduct of the
proceeding,and finally these same trustees and
lawyers appear before the judge as litigants and
counsel when a controversy arises.
As a result of the conditions discussed above,

and I am sure for other reasons, there grew up
over the years an isolation of the bankruptcy
bench and bar from the mainstream of American

jurisprudence and from the judiciary and the legal
fraternity generally. Persons practicing in the
bankruptcy field tended to confine their

'u.S., Congress, House

Committee on the Judiciary,

Bankruptcv Law Revision. H. Rept. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st
1977, pt. 1, p. 538.
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activities exclusively to that area, and the
Bankruptcy Court, of course, did so from

necessity. Therefore, a relatively small group of
lawyers controlled the bankruptcy field. Those
not within this group tended to regard them with
suspicion and distrust. I believe that in the
last ten years there may be some evidence that
this "separate but unequal" status of the
bankruptcy lawyers is being eliminated to some
extent; but when the bar associations discuss one

of their favorite new subjects, that of

"specialization," the first thing that everyone
agrees upon is that bankruptcy can be labeled a
"specialty," although thereafter consensus
immediately disappears. There is no real reason
for this other than a historical one.

The problems caused by the combination of the
administrative and judicial responsibility for a case, the
lack of true creditor control, and the cronyism of the

"bankruptcy ring" were not new.

The Bankruptcy Commission

documented them in detail.
Previous Studies

Other studies of the bankruptcy system were made that

also recommended a separate agency to administer the
bankruptcy caseload.

The first major study of the system

was done by William J. Donovan for the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.

The

Brookinqs Report (1968) was furnished by a task force from

^''u.S., Congress, House, Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws
of the United States, Report of the Commission on the
Bankruptcv Laws of the United States. H. Rept. 93-137, 93rd
Cong., 1st sess., 1973.
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Brookings Institution.

The Comitiission on the Bankruptcy

Laws of the United States was established by Public Law 91

354 and existed from July 24, 1970, to July 30, 1973.

It

conducted 8 days of public hearings and 44 days of executive
sessions.
Donovan Report

The Donovan Report (1929) was the first major study of

the bankruptcy system in the United States.

It was headed

by William J. Donovan for the United States District Court
for the Soutliern District of New York.

The report indicated

that ijankruptcy law administration was characterized by
serious abuses and malpractice on the part of attorneys,

receivers, trustees, appraisers, custodians, auctioneers,
and other persons and associations.

The conditions were

caused by two main features of the Act:

1)

Slow-moving procedural machinery laid down by the

Act; • " •

2)

The theory underlying the administrative structure

of the Act (creditor control), was not working and the
actual administrative functions were being handled by court
controlled administrators.

The report stated that there was no agency to study the

major problems of administration and there was no uniformity
of practice.

It concluded that the matters required study

on a national scale which could be accomplished only by a

13

federal executive agency.

The report recoitiinended creation

of a federal bankruptcy commissioner to license and

supervise trustees; investigate complaints against trustees
and abuses in administration; make rules and coordinate the

System; compile statistics, data, and make studies and
reports; establish

bureaus to examine and

supervise transactions in nominal and no-asset cases.

It

was suggested that these changes would Separate the judicial
functions from the administrative ones and vest the

administrative functighs in the commissioner.
As a result of the Donovan Report. changes were

proposed in the system to solve these problems and to make
the bankruptcy system more efficient and fairer.

Although

the estates would still use private trustees, a government

official would supervise bankruptcy administration, thereby
ensuring fair and efficient administration.
Brookinas Report

A task force to study bankruptcy administration was
created in 1968 by the Brookings Institution.

Its report,

published in 1971, pronounced the current system a failure
and recommended elimination of the courts and, in their

David T. Stanley and Marjorie Girth. Bankruptcy:
Problem. Process, Reform. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1971).
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place, establishment of an independent executive agency to
handle bankruptcy cases

The report stated:

The total bankruptcy system gets its job done
according to the literal requirements of the law,
but it is a dreary, costly, slow, and unproductive
process. Compared to what the system might be
doing, the present reality is a shabby and
indifferent effort.

Management by coalition of referees,
trustees, and the bankruptcy bar which is of
little benefit to debtors, creditors,or the

public. Management characterized by loose
supervision, infrequent field examinations, little
concern for qualifications of personnel, archaic
procedures, high costs, and unwarranted delays.
These shortcomings are a natural result of
using a judicial system to try to solve problems
that are by nature administrative. The judicial

system relies on adversary procedure and on judges
who are for the most part not highly skilled in
the supervision of bankruptcy matters or in the
selection of expert referees.

Commission on Bankruptcv Laws of the United States

Congress began hearings on bankruptcy in 1968 and
created the Commission on Bankruptcy Laws of the United
States (Bankruptcy Commission) in 1970.

The purpose of the

commission was to study, analyze, and recommend changes in
the bankruptcy laws.

Submitted to Congress in 1973, the

report recommended a separation of judicial and
administrative functions by the formation of a bankruptcy

court with expanded jurisdiction to handle judicial

^^Corporate

reorganizations

were

to

administered exclusively by district courts.

15

be

filed

and

functions and an executive agency (United States Bankruptcy

Administration) to perform administrative functions.
Conclusion

The common conclusion reached in the Donovan Report,

the Brookinqs Report, and the Bankruptcy Commission report

was that there was no agency equipped to handle increasingly
complex bankruptcy cases.

They recommended that a separate

agency be created to handle administration of the bankruptcy
system.

16

CHAPTER III

PILOT PROGRAM

Introduction

Section 408 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978

established a United States Trustee pilot program that
became effective on October 1, 1979 (see Appendix I).

The

program, housed within the Department of Justice, was under

the jurisdiction of the Attorney General (see Appendix II).
The Attorney General formulated standards for panels of

private trustees and standing trustees as required by title
11 of the legislation.
The U.S. Trustee, rather than the court, in a
pilot district will...supervise administration of
bankruptcy cases and exercise any other function
prescribed by the Attorney General, such as
presiding at first meetings of creditors, related
to bankruptcy administration....The main purpose
of the U.S. trustee is to remove administrative

duties from the bankruptcy judge leaving the
bankruptcy judge free to resolve disputes
untainted by knowledge of matters unnecessary to a

judicial determination.^^
For courts not involved in the pilot study, the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts (AO)

performed comparable functions.

Non-pilot districts

^^U.S., Congress, House, Representative Edwards speaking
on Introducing the House Amendments to the Senate Amendments
to H. Rept. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st sess., 20 September, 1977,
Congressional Record. 124: H11089.
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established a panel of trustees who Were to act under the

supervision of the AO.

Administrative functions were

handled by "estate administrators," employed by the

bankruptcy clerk's office.

The estate administrator system,

however, lacked the staffing allocation and authority that
the UST was given, which resulted in a lower level of case
administration in non-pilot districts.

The pilot program consisted of an Executive Office for
United States Trustees and 10 field offices (and necessary

satellite offices) headed by United States Trustees.

Of the

94 judicial districts, 18 were included in the program.
Organization of the United States Trustee Program

The UST program, which consisted of 10 field offices

covering 18 judicial districts throughout the United States,
became effective the date of the Bankruptcy Code: October 1,

1979.

It began as a five year pilot program under the

United States Department of Justice.

The newly enacted

chapter 39 to title 28 of the United States Code, entitled
"United States trustees," established the office of UST and

prescribed duties, salaries, and miscellaneous provisions
for governance;

These provisions are modeled after the

United States Attorney system.
The Executive Office for the United States Trustees was

established in Washington, D.C. and is headed by an
executive directof, who is appointed by the United States

18

Attorney General.

The Director provides policy direction,

coordination, legal counsel, and administrative support to
the individual United States trustees on behalf of the
Attorney General.

By way of the Bankruptcv Judges. United States
Trustees, and Family Farmer Bankruptcv Act of 1986. the

program became permanent and nationwide.
excepted,

With two states

the Act created 21 regions, each with a UST who

is appointed by the Attorney General to a 5 year term.

The

trustee is subject to removal by the Attorney General.

It

also allowed the appointment of Assistant United States
Trustees as necessary.

Although, the program is self-funded

from fees collected in various cases (see Appendix III),

actual fundihg of tha program is determined by cpngressional
appropriation.

During the 1990 fiscal year, approximately

$60 million was allocated to the program for the maintenance

and operation of 88 regional offices and 800 personnel

15

''^Alabama (11th Gircuit) and North Carolina (4th Circuit)
judicial districts opted out of the program.
They are to
become part of the program at the earlier of: (1) an election

by a majority of the bankruptcy judges of such judicial
district which chooses to be included in a bankruptcy region
established under 28 U.S. Code, sec. 581(a), or (2) October

1, 1992. Bankruptcv Judges. United States Trustees and Family
Farmer Bankruptcy Act of 1986. Statutes at Large 100:

3088

(1986).:

^-Edward M. Melillo, "The Organization and Role of the
United States Trustee Under the Bankruptcy Code," California
Bankruptcv Journal. (California Bankruptcy Forum, Vol. 18 No.
4, 1990), p. 366.
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Role of the United States Trustee

The UST monitors all trustees and cases under chapters

If 11, 12 and 13.

Congress established this office to be

"bankruptcy watchdogs to prevent fraud, dishonesty and
overreaching in the bankruptcy arena..." to "...relieve

bankruptcy judges of their current administrative and

supervisory role...become the principal administrative
officers of the bankruptcy system."

They are not intended

to serve as an extension of the court system, but rather as

having a separate and distinct role and duty to execute and
enforce the bankruptcy laws; to be responsible for

supervising the day to day administration of bankruptcy
cases to insure that the intent and requirements of the

Bankrubtcv Code are being met.

Various regional and

satellite offices monitor trustees and analyze their cases
on a continuous basis, as reguired by the Code, through use

of a computerized case management system that both logs and

indexes regional bankruptcy filings and can give access to
case information from other regions.
Chapter 7 Cases

As provided for under the Bankruptcv Code. the UST

maintains and supervises a panel of private individuals to
serve as interim trustees in chapter 7 cases; these must

meet all qualifications established by the attorney general

(see Appendix IV).

The interim trustee liquidates the non

20

exempt, unencumbered assets of the debtor.

Chapter 7

debtors (individuais) receivd discharges of their rion
dischargeable debts and thus receive their financial "fresh
start."

The chapter 7 business/dorporate debtor does not

receive a discharge; rather, the business assets are

liguidated and the case is closed.
Interim trustees must be bonded in an amount determined

by the regional UST's office.

All chapter 7 trustees are

required to submit semi-ahnual reports to the UST for their
judicial district.

These reports must summarize no-asset

cases and provide an itemized breakdown of asset cases.

The

reports on asset cases include property values,

encumbrances, sales, expenses and liquid assets; exemptions
and property abandonments for both asset and non-asset cases

are included.

Chapter 7 trustees are audited by the Office

of the inspector General, DOJ Audit Staff.

Information from

audits (which includes operational surveys, cash management
reviews and compliance inspections) is used to identify
internal control weaknesses in the individual trustee's case

administration or cash management practices.
Chapter 11 Cases

In chapter 11 business reorganization cases, the debtor

remains in possession of and continues to operate the
business.

Occasionally, and upon court order, a trustee is

appointed in lieu of the debtor-in-possession.
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Under this

chapter, the debt and equity of the debtor can be

restructured through a plan of reorganization, which is
subject to approval by creditors and the court.

Upon

confirmation of the plan, chapter 11 provides a framework
for its implementation.

The UST of each district assigns an attorney and an

analyst (employees of the UST) to monitor the progress of
the district's chapter 11 cases.

The UST solicits an

"official creditors' committee"^^ shortly after the case is
filed.

This committee oversees the reorganization of the

debtor and brings matters to the attention of the UST the

committee deems necessary.

The UST (as represented by his

attorney) meets with the debtor and counsel to discuss

aspects of the case such as the reason(s) for the filing;
the financial eondition and management of the debtor; the

prospects for reorganization; and the operating and
reporting requirements.

In addition to required interim

reporting, the debtor is also required to pay quarterly fees
to the UST, which are then submitted to the executive office

to fund the program.

In most "confirmed" chapter 11 cases,

the debtor remains in control of the business with oversight

^"^The "official creditors' committee" consists of the
twenty largest unsecured creditors of a chapter 11 debtor.
The committee is appointed by the UST as soon as three or more
qualified
creditors
express
a
willingness
to
serve.
Additional

members

of

the

committee

are

creditors at the first meeting of creditors.
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solicited

from

by a creditors' committee (if any) and the UST; however, in
some instances a chapter 11 trustee or receiver is appointed
where there is cause.
Chapter 13 Cases

Chapter 13 requires that an individual have a regular
source of income with which to propose a plan that will pay

all or a portion of their debts over a period of time (not
to exceed 60 months).

This plan is subject to approval by

creditors, the standing trustee, and the court.

The UST appoints a chapter 13 standing trustee for each

region who is subject to qualifications similar to those

required of the chapter 7 trustee.

A bond is required for

each in an amount equal to or greater than 150 percent of

the total monthly average of all bank balances in the
standing trustee's bank accounts, including the expense
account.

Audits are conducted annually by the Office of the

Inspector General, DOJ Audit Staff, or by an independent
accounting firm.

Additionally, chapter 13 trustees are

required to submit an annual report and budget for review by
the UST.

^^"Cause" may be actions by the debtor-in-possession such
as misappropriation of funds, failure to maintain insurance,
or to pay taxes and salaries.
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chapter 12 Cases

Chapter 12 is restricted to "family fainners."

The UST

appoints a standing trustee to oversee cases that are
handled in a manner similar to chapter 13
Other Functions

In addition to the appointment of trustees and

oversight of bankruptcy case administration and trustees,
the trsT has the following responsibilities:

1)

The UST authorizes financial institutions to hold

deposits for debtors and trustees.

These institutions must

provide quarterly banking and collateralization reports to

the UST showing the amount of liquid assets on deposit for
each debtor account, the type(s) of account(s), and the
amount of excess funds over $100,000 held for each debtor.

2)

The UST may participate in actions for relief,

which may be heard on any issue relating to trustee
responsibilities in a case under the Code.

These actions

may be motions to dismiss or convert a case, to appoint a

trustee or receiver, to object to the discharge of a debtor,
or to other appropriate relief.

Because it Was the intent

of Congress that the UST play an active role in cases under
the Bankruptcv Code. many courts have held that the UST

should be granted party-in-interest status for all
administrative responsibilities.
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3)

The UST becomes involved in "bad faith" bankruptcy

case filings/® and/or where bankruptcy crimes^' may have
been committed.

Such violations and crimes are reported to

the UST who then refers the matter to the United States

Attorney or other law enforcement agencies.
Conclusion

The BRA required the Attorney General to conduct a

study of the pilot program during the transition period, and
•
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annually thereafter, and report his findings to Congress.
The section contained a "sunset" provision that would

abolish the pilot program as well as the Administrative
Office counterpart in the DOJ effective April 1, 1984,
assuming Congress refused to extend the UST program.

^®"Bad faith" filings consist of multiple filings by a
debtor; transfers of property to avoid pending court action;
refiling in violation of a previous court order; seeking a
discharge of debts within 6 years of a prior discharge;
attempts to discharge primarily consumer debts under chapter
7 that could be paid through a chapter 13 plan.

^'Bankruptcy "crimes" include the concealment or transfer
of estate assets; perjury; failure to disclose ownership and
transfers of real property of an estate; providing false
information on the bankruptcy petition and schedules; and
fraud.

^°"Not later than January 3, 1984, the Attorney General
shall report to the Congress, to the President, and the
Judicial

Conference

of

the

United

States,

as

to

the

feasibility, projected annual cost and effectiveness of the
United States trustee system, as determined on the basis of
the studies and surveys respecting the operations...together
with recommendations as to the desirability and method of

proceeding with implementation..in all judicial districts of
the United States."

at Large 92;

Bankruotcv Reform Act of 1978. Statutes

2549 (1978).
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Due to a controversy involving the jurisdiction and

power of bankruptcy judges,

the pilot program was extended

twice with the second extension ending September 30, 1986.

Passage of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984 resolved the controversy and allowed further
consideration of the UST program.

"There has been a continuing tension and adjustment
between the strictures of Article III of the Constitution,

which requires that judges of the federal courts be appointed
for life ('good behavior') and the need for more federal

judges/arbiters/referees/ magistrates. Appointments for life
have the partial advantage of political insulation; however,
senility, disability, expense and lack of responsiveness are
only a few of the disadvantages. When Congress passed the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. the bankruptcy judges were to

receive 14-year terms and to be restricted in their exercise
of jurisdiction to cases and controversies arising in or
related to bankruptcy cases. The jurisdictional grant was too
expansive to survive an Article III violation challenge, and
a badly divided Supreme Court found in its plurality decision
in the Marathon

rNorthern Pipeline Construction Company v.

Marathon Pipe Line Company. 459 U.S. 1094 (1982)] case that
the Bankruptcy Code was unconstitutional if the bankruptcy

judges had only Article I (term of years) status. Rather than
have its decision result in chaos, the Supreme Court took the

unusual step of staying its order so that Congress could
either elevate the bankruptcy judges to Article III judges or
prune back the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts to

something
Bankruptcy

resembling
Act

of

old

1898.

summary jurisdiction
After

two

under the

extensions.

Congress

finally adopted the latter course, but the system is still
unstable."

Hon. David N. Naugle, United States Bankruptcy

Judge, San Bernardino, California, Interview on April 19,
1991.
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CHAPTER IV

EVALUATION OF THE PILOT PROGRAM

Introduction

The 1978 statute mandated that an evaluation of the

pilot program be conducted, and it further directed that the
DOJ report to Congress, the President, and the Judicial
Conference of the United States no later than January 3,

1984, on the effectiveness of the United States trustee

system and the desirability and method of proceeding with
full implementation in all judicial districts.

The

evaluation was intended to address the following questions:

1)

Has the UST system been successful in accomplishing

its objectives?
2)

Are there any alternatives to the UST system that

could do as well or better at accomplishing the
objectives?

3)

What modifications to the UST system might improve

its effectiveness?

4)

How cost-effective is the current pilot program,

and what would be the costs of nationwide expansion?
Abt Associates Evaluation (1983)

The statutorily mandated study and evaluation of the

pilot program was done by an independent consulting firm.
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Abt Associates.

Its report, forwarded to Congress by the
.
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Attorney General, strongly supports the pilot program.

The study compared bankruptcy administration in pilot
districts to districts that did not have United States

trustees.

It concluded that the program was sound in theory

and that it demonstrated its effectiveness empirically.

The evaluation design had two components:

1) Qualitative data were collected in 11 pilot
and 9 non-pilot districts through: (a) examination
of local rules, policy statements, manuals, and
other written materials; (b) in-depth interviews
with UST and clerk's office staff; (c) interviews
with judges, trustees, and other members of the
bankruptcy community. The qualitative component
addressed case administration in the three primary
chapters of the Code: 11, 7, and 13.

2)

Quantitative data were gathered by examining

the court dockets and case files of approximately

1,500 cases selected from 18 matched pairs of
pilot and non-pilot districts. The cases were
randomly sampled from those filed during the year
ending June 30, 1981. Three types of cases were
sampled: chapter 11 cases; chapter 7 voluntary
consumer cases; and chapter 7 business or
involuntary cases.

Summarv of results

Results of the Abt study are organized around the

research questions addressed by the evaluation as follows:

^^Nancy L. Ames, Lindsey D. Stellwagen, and Ralph T.
Jones,

An Evaluation of the U.S. Trustee Pilot Program for

Bankruptcv

Administration:

Cambridge:

Abt Associates.

Findings

1983.
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and

Recommendations.

1.

Has the United States trustee system been successful in

accomplishing its objectives?
Abt found that in both concept and practice, the

UST system achieves its goals.

To assure unbiased and

efficient processing of bankruptcy cases, separation of
administration and judicial functions is essential.
Through active monitoring of cases by the trustee

system, interests of creditors are being met.
Additionally, the system's "watch-dog" monitoring of
attorney's fees has helped prevent excessive fees and
poor representation of debtors by the bar.
The program is found to encourage, rather than

discourage, participation of creditors in case
administration (creditors committees in chapter 11

cases, for example).

The trustee, considered to be a

disinterested party, can be representative of parallel
public interests.
The program is not duplicative of functions

performed by the clerks' office, nor is it another
bureaucratic"layer" in the bankruptcy system.

Some

"overlap" in the duties of the UST, the court, and the
clerks' office, particularly in chapter 7 case

administration, was found.

This overlap is considered

to be minimal and easily rectified; it is considered to
be important as a "check and balance" in the system.
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In short, as envisioned by the legislative
framers, the program serves a crucial role in

bankruptcy administration—a role that is
neither excessively duplicative nor
unnecessarily expansive.

The report listed the primary functions of the UST
program and its findings as to whether or not those
functions had been satisfied.

A)

They are as follows:

Monitor the debtor-in-possession in chapter 11

business reorganization cases and to take appropriate
action as necessary.
Finding:

While both United States trustees in

pilot districts and estate administrators in non-

pilot districts consider efficient case monitoring
and case administration to be a high priority, the

level of both monitoring and case administration

was significantly higher in the pilot districts
and resulted in a higher percentage of confirmed

plans and a lower level of cases showing no
activity.

B)

Establish, maintain, and supervise panels of

private trustees responsible for chapter 7 case
administration.

Finding:

Due to budgetary cutbacks in 1981 within

the UST program and concomitant reduction in
staffing, case monitoring was focused on asset

chapter 7 cases.

Non-pilot districts also placed
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chapter 7's at a lower level of priority; routine
administration was performed in the clerk's
office.

Pilot districts, however, provided more

training, advice, and supervision to panel
trustees than did non-pilot districts.

Additionally, both the UST and the court review
panel trustees fee applications and bank
statements.

The UST may remove the panel trustees

for inadequate performance.

Estate administrators

in non-pilot districts do not have removal
authority.

C)

Appoint and supervise standing trustees who

are responsible for chapter 13 case administration.
Finding;

Low priority is given by the UST to

monitoring chapter 13 standing trustees because of
limited funding.

The decision was made when the

pilot program was commenced to concentrate
resources on chapter 11 and chapter 7 cases.

Estate administrators in non-pilot districts
concentrate on chapter 11 and chapter 7 cases

also, so few differences were found in the two

programs.

The differences that were found in

administration were due to variances in local

rules and policies rather than to the involvement
of the UST.

Pilot districts received more

31

support, auditing, and monitoring of legal fees
and fraudulent practices than did non-pilot
districts.

2.

Are there alternatives to the UST system that could do

as well or better at accomplishing objectives?

The study found that the UST trustee program is
superior to the estate administrator system.
Additional recommendations are made as to the "seating"

of the system.

The options considered are:

the

clerk's office; a new independent or quasi-independent

agency; the DOJ; another executive agency.
A)

The UST system is preferable to estate

administrators for the following reasons:

1)

Location of estate admihistrators within

the clerks' office does not support the

desired separation of administrative and;

judicial functions;
2)

The estate administrator system lacks the

staff, resources, and authority to function
as the UST does.

B)

Housing the program in a new independent or

quasi-independent agency would be costly and may

subject the program to elimination because of
federal budget cuts and/or changes in the
political environment.
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C)

To achieve the goal of separation of judicial

and administrative functions, an estate

administrator-type system must be completely

independent of the court.

Maintaining the system

within the DOJ is recommended for the following
reasons:

1)

It maintains continuity of management,

policy direction, budgetary planning, and
experience.

2)

Potential conflicts of interest between

the DOJ (advocate of the government) and the

UST (impartial case administrator) have not
occurred.

3)

The pilot program has been effective

while housed in the DOJ.

4)

The legislative intent for placing the

pilot program in the DOJ still applies.^^
3.

What modifications to the UST System might improve its

effectiveness?

^^Drafters

of

the

bankruptcy

legislation

cited

the

following reasons for seating the UST program within the
Department of Justice: (1) lawyers are readily available who
understand the Bankruptcv Code and UST mandate; (2) authority
to coordinate support between the UST's and the United States
attorneys; (3) prestige to attract qualified USTVs; (4) there
was in place, within the Department of Justice, an agency with
an organizational model (United States Attorney's office)
similar to the one recommended for the UST program (3-tiered

organizational structure with a central/executive office,
regional offices and local/satellite offices).
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Expansion of the program is recommended.

Modifications

are suggested for improved case administration.
A)

Intensified monitoring of cases, development

of standard specifications for financial reports,
and increased use of debtor and creditor

conferences are needed for chapter 11 cases.

B)

Refinements to the current chapter 7 case

administration system, such as increased
uniformity of forms, policies and procedures;

limiting panel trustee membership so that
individual annual caseload is 200-250; reassessing
trustee fee structure; instituting an IRS-type
audit of debtors.

C)

Variability throughout judicial districts is

cited as a problem in chapter 13 case
administration.

It is recommended that there be

increased guidance and standardization in case
processing.
In addition to chapter specific recommendations,
computerized case management and delineation of
responsibilities between the trustee and bankruptcy
court to reduce overlap are recommended.

4.

How cost-effective is the current pilot program, and

what would be the costs of nationwide expansion?
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An analysis was done of the amount of pilot

program funds allocated to offices and functions;
percentage of funds for personnel versus non-personnel
items; office staffing patterns; and office resources
adjusted for caseload.

Assuming sufficient staff to provide the same
level of service and a similar regional office model
within the clerk's office as proposed for the UST

program, it is estimated that start-up costs for the
estate administration system would be 20 million

dollars for the first year of operation and 19 million
dollars for the second.

Cost estimates for the expanded UST program are

24.2 million dollars for the first year and 23 million

dollars for the second.

These figures assume that the

program would maintain its current functions and
priorities; be housed within the DOJ; and have the same
3—tiered organizational structure.

Study findings show significant differences in
efficient case administration between pilot and non-

pilot districts.

The increased case administration

efficiency in the pilot districts combined with the
necessity of administrative and judicial independence

outweigh the cost savings of implementing an estate
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administrator program within the Administrative Office
of the United States courts.

Summarv of Recommendations

The 1983 Abt Associates study recommended that the UST

Program be expanded and implemented on a nationwide basis.
It recommended further that the program remain in the DOJ

and expressly recommended that it not be placed within the
judiciary (under the control of the Administrative Office of
the United States Courts) as this would

in many ways threaten the independence from the

judiciary that was originally sought in creating
the U.S. Trustee Program....An association between
the court and the U.S. trustee's office, even if

loosely structured, would hinder both the
independent operation of each and the public

perception of independence.^^
A 3-tiered, regionally structured organization for the

program is recommended to minimize costs and maximize
continuity with the current pilot program.

Preservation of

integrity within the bankruptcy system as well as efficient
and effective case management justify the costs involved in
the implementation of the expanded United States trustee
program.

Abt Associates Evaluation Update

ClSBSl

Because of the delay caused by the controversy in
Northern Pipeline Construction Companv. Congress required an

update on the information in the 1983 Abt Associates study.

^^Ames et al., p. 258.
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The first study was based on data from 20 pilot and non-

pilot districts; 6 pilot and 5 non-pilot districts were used
by Abt Associates in the update.
Chapter 11 cases

The update found that the UST program made a

significant difference in the administration of chapter 11
cases by aggressively monitoring debtofs-in-posSession and
taking remedial action when debtors fail to meet their
responsibilities.

There has been improvement in the

supervision of the chapter 13 standing trustees in pilot
districts.

This has been done by monitoring budgets^

standardizing audit procedures, and improving administrative
efficiency.

Administration of chapter 7 cases is highly

variable among districts and panel trustees; however, policy
guidelines have been established that govern the employment
of professionals, the abandonment of assets, and the
investment of estate funds.

Steps have been taken to ensure

fiscal accountability through standardized financial

reporting and random audits of panel trustees.
Supporting the prior study. United States trustees
continue to be more active than estate administrators in

monitoring chapter 11 cases.

with significant progress:

The study identified 2 areas

monitoring both the financial

position of the debtor-in-possession and the payment of
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post-petition taxes.

Additionally, the trustee was more

likely to take action where cases were not progressing.
Chapter 7

The original study critiGized the lack of uniformity
among districts and trustees in case administration and
liquidation of estate assets in chapter 7 cases.

Although

some progress has been made, the 1985 study suggests further

strengthening in chapter 7 case administration.
Chapter 13 cases

Monitoring of chapter 13 cases continues to be of low

priority in both pilot and non-pilot districts. Substantial
variation in case administration by standing chapter 13

trustees remains, due in part to varying judicial standards

in confirming chapter 13 plans, caseload size, availability
of automation/coinputers and state tax laws.

Some progress

has been made in the area of strengthened audit

procedures,

automation, and monitoring of chapter 13

standing trustee expenditures'

Additipnally, the Executive

Office of the UST has allotted a staff person to coordinate
the chapter 13 program.

^^Such

actions include motions before the court for

dismissal of a casP or conversion to chapter 7 when a plan of

reorganization has not been timely filed or confirmed.

^^An on-site audit is performed by either a national
accounting firm (for trustee's annual receipts exceeding
$250,000) or by the Department of Justice for standing
trustees not subject to audit by the national accounting firm.
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other Functions

The pilot districts have been more successful than non-

pilot districts in fulfilling other functions:

general

"watchdog"; (2) promoting standardization; (3) encouraging
automation.

The estate administration system's weaknesses

in these areas are due primarily to lack of personnel;

budgetary restrictions; lack of prestige and authority with
attorneys; location within the clerk's office; variability
among districts' policies and procedures; lack of authority
to take remedial action when debtors-in-possession fail to

meet their responsibilities.^^
Alternatives

The alternative to the UST program is the estate

administration system being used in non-pilot districts.

Although deputy clerks have generally performed their
function well, the disadvantages, as above-cited, warrant

placement of the trustee system outside the judiciary.
Recommendations

The 1985 update to the Abt Associates 1983 evaluation
supports nationwide expansion of the UST program.

Current

recommendations parallel ones made in the original report.

^^The Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Guam
Restaurant v. Soeciner further reinforced the lack of standing
of the clerk's office by prohibiting sua sponte action by the
court.
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1.

Housing the program

To guarantee separation of administrative and
judicial functions, the program should remain
housed in the United States DOJ rather than in the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.

Housing it in the DOJ allows continuity of the

program, management, policy direction, staff, and
budgeting.

Potential conflicts of interest

between the DOJ as an advocate for the United

States government and the UST as impartial case
administrator have not materialized.

The UST

program has been effective in this location (DOJ)
and has the staff, prestige, authority, and

organizational model (United States Attorney) to
fulfill the legislative intent of the bankruptcy
program.

2.

Organizational structure for the UST program

Continuation of the 3-tiered organizational
structure is recommended.

This consists of;

a) a central/executive office, headed by an
executive officer, to provide policy

guidance, supervision, and budget management;
b) regional offices, headed by United States
trustees, to coordinate functions within a
district; monitor activities of local
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offices; provide coordination and support;
and screen and select assistant United States
trustees;

c) local offices, headed by Assistant United
states trustees, to monitor and administer
caseload within local areas.
Personnel resources

The 1983 evaluation contained a detailed cost

and resource analysis for nationwide expansion of

the UST program.

A replication of this analysis

was considered to be beyond the scope of this
study.

Some recommendations, however, were

proffered should the program be expanded.
A)

Seven year appointments by the Attorney

General of the UST with assistant UST

positions to be by merit rather than
appointment;

B)

An increase in salary for lawyers and

financial analysts in the UST offices to
recruit and retain qualified staff;
C)

Currently, there are no statutory

restrictions for removal from a trustee

panel; recommend "for cause" restriction aS
it is for removal of a trustee from a case;
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D)

A term of membership, with staggered

terms, for panel trustees is recommended to

ensure continuity and experience on the
panel.
Other modifications
Further modifications to the UST trustee

system are recommended to make the expanded

program more effective and efficient.
A)

Chapter 11 cases

1)

increase the use of conferences with

debtors and creditors;

2)

intensify monitoring so that

remedial action is taken in a timely
manner;

3)

clarify statutes on the standing of

the UST to take remedial action and

advise on matters concerning the

adequacy of disclosure statements and
plans.
B)

Chapter 7 cases

Two alternative approaches for case
administration are recommended:

1)

Refine the current system by:

a) fully implementing existing
policy directives;
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b) continuing with and expanding
current efforts to standardize

trustee reports and monitoring
trustee performance;

c) introducing an IRS-type audit of
debtors.

2)

Allow in-house administration of

small and no-asset cases (less than $500
28

of non-exempt, unencumbered assets)
the UST office.

by

This option would

entail no additional cost to the

government as the cost of an in-house
attorney would be offset by the "per

case" fee that is paid to panel
trustees.

Advantages of in-house

administration include increased

efficiency, aggressive pursuit of small
assets, and improved public perception
of the bankruptcy system.

Field testing

of this option is recommended.

^^This is not allowed under the statute.

The UST may

serve as a trustee in a case "where no one is willing to
serve" under Section 15701(b) of the Code.
A broad

interpretation may allow administration by the UST on a case
by-case basis.
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C)

Chapter 13 cases

Continued auditing and monitoring
of fees and administrative expenses of

the standing trustees is recommended.
They should he encouraged to reduce fees

when possible.

Additionally, the UST

should encourage and assist the standing
trustees in stream-lining Chapter 13
case administration.
Conclusion

The conclusions reached in the original Abt Associates
evaluation were reaffirmed in the August, 1985, update of

the original study.

The update evaluation of the UST pilot

program found it to be sound theoretically and effective
empirically.

The program maintained its strength in

chapter 11 case administration, continued to make
recommendations for improvements in chapter 7 case

administration, and realized improved effectiveness in

chapter 13 case administration.

Additionally, it

contributed to the efficiency and integrity of the
bankruptcy system.

Nationwide expansion of the program was

recommended by both the 1983 Abt Associates evaluation and
the 1985 Abt Associates update.
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main purpose of the United States trustee system is
to separate the administrative from the judicial functions
of the court.

This "separatism" addressed criticisms of the

former bankruptcy system (prior to the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 19781.

1)

Those criticisms were as follows:

The combination of administrative and judicial

responsibility for a case;
2)

Lack of true creditor control;

3)

Cronyism of the "bankruptcy ring."

The solution to these criticisms appeared to be a

combination of professionalization, oversight, financial
security, and classical separation of powers.

with passage of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. a

UST pilot program was established to provide administrative
and oversight functions to the bankruptcy system while
leaving adjudicative matters to bankruptcy judges.

This

placed judicial functions within the judicial branch and

"watchdog" and administrative functions within the executive
branch.

The reguirements of the Attorney General for appoint
ment of United States Trustees ensured professionalization
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(See AppendiJi IV). Employment of panel and standing
trustees is done by the office of the UST instead of by the

court, thereby removing the appearance of "cronyism" with
the court.

Monitoring and auditing of panel and standing

trustees, as well as establishing guidelines, policies aind

procedures provide further evidence of separation from the
court of administrative functions.

Creditor control in chapter 11 cases has been regained

through use and encouragement by the UST of creditors'

committeeis.

Additionally, iitigation for the benefit of the

estate (thus the creditors) can be initiated by the UST.
Such actions can gain assets for the estate, thereby
benefitting creditors.

Further oversight and participation by the UST is

needed in day-to-day chapter 11 case administration.
According to the Abt reports, there are significantly more

chapter 11 cases with confirmed plans of reorganization in
pilot districts than there are in non-pilot districts.
Current policy causes monitoring of cases by the UST to
cease after plan confirmation when regular payments are to

be made to creditors and taxing agencies.

With no oversight

during this post-confirmation period, there is no
accountabi1ity for plan payments by the "reconstituted"
debtor.

Remedial action must come from the court's

involvement in administrative oversight of the case wherein
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the matter is brought to the attention of the bankruptcy

judge, who then requests action on the part of the UST.

Procedurally, the UST is not required to take action since
the case has a confirmed plan.

Therein lies the conflict:

Is the judge entering the administrative arena and through

"ex parte" communication requiring or suggesting action from
the bankruptcy "watchdog"?
It is recommended that further standardization of

policies, procedures, and forms be established within the
court.

Currently, each district has its own forms and local

rules and procedures; the guidelines for the requirements of
the UST differ in each district.

This can be viewed as

confusing and inequitable to the bankruptcy bar.

Appearances of cronyism have been repotted fcy bar members
who are not familiar with local procedure and who are
faulted for failing to follow the local rules.

Local

practitioners, meanwhile, appear to have easier access to
the bench.

Additional refinements in policy are needed regarding
the dollar amount of assets in an estate that cause a

chapter 7 trustee to declare it a "no-asset" case.

Panel

trustees within a district self-determine what constitutes

an asset versus a no-asset case; many times the ease with

which the asset may be realized for the estate is the

determining factor.

While one trustee may set $500.00 as
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the iniriimuTn to be realized for an asset case, another

trustee may establish $100,000.00 as the: criterion.

CertainlY this lack of an established guideline may lead to
enrichment for one estate and enrichment of one trustee in

another case.

Creditors may realize nothing from an estate

while the trustee absorbs the assets to pay his "costs of
administration."

Additional auditing of fees and expenses

claimed by standing and panel trustees is advised to ensure
accountability.

Upon expansion of the UST program, trustees appointed
under the old system (by the judges) had the option to be

"re-employed" as panel trustees under the supervision of the
UST.

Auditing the records of these "re-employed" trustees

is recommended in cases assigned to them prior to UST

supervision.^' While the UST is actively and aggressively
cohfrOnting this issue, more action may be necessary.

The lack of adequate personnel to accomplish these
recommendations, as well as recommendations made in the Abt
reports, continues to be a problem.

Although the UST

program is self-funding, the program is subject to
limitations imposed by the appropriations process.
The enormous increase in bankruptcy filings and
concomitant detrimental effect on numerous creditors

^'a case pending in the Northern District of California
involves a "court appointed" trustee, for alleged fraudulent
actions and misappropriation of estate funds.
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requires immediate attention to the bankruptcy system.

The

establishment of the UST program appears to have a positive
effect on the administration of the system, but budgetary

priorities must be reevaluated.
Further standardization of policies and procedures

within the bankruptcy system and UST program is necessary.
Additionally, automation and computerization is essential.
Currently there are pilot districts undergoing automation,
but many courts are so large that the programs are unable to
handle the caseload.

With automation comes the ability to

audit the bankruptcy system more accurately, something noted
in the Abt reports.

While the UST program has an

automation system that allows for case monitoring, the

courts do not have the capability to do so and must rely on
other personnel to oversee case administration.
Overall, the UST program (in effect nationwide for 5

years) has proven to be an effective and cost efficient
means of monitoring and overseeing bankruptcy case
administration.

Evaluation of the current program would be

valuable in discovering and assessing problem areas within

the system.

Further Congressional action and legislation

may be required to strengthen and refine both the UST
program and the bankruptcy system.
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APPENDIX I:

28 United States Code, Section 581

United States trustees,

(a)

The Attorney General shall appoint one United

States trustee for each of the following regions composed of

Federal judicial districts (without regard to section 451);
(1)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and
Rhode Island,

(2)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Connecticut, New York, and Vermont.

(3)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Delaware, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania.

(4)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Virginia, and West Virginia and for the District of
Columbia.

(5)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Louisiana and Mississippi.
(6)

The Northern District of Texas and the

Eastern District of Texas.

(7)

The Southern District of Texas and the

Western District of Texas.

(8)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Kentucky and Tennessee.

50

(9)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Michigan and Ohio.

(10)

The Central District of Illinois and the

Southern District of Illinois; and the judicial
districts established for the State of Indiana.

(11)

The Northern District of Illinois; and the

judicial districts established for the State of
Wisconsin.

(12)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Minnesota, Iowa, North Dakota, and South
Dakota.

(13)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Arkansas, Nebraska, and Missouri.

(14)

The District of Arizona.

(15)

The Southern District of California; and the

judicial districts established for the State of Hawaii;
and for Guam and the Commonwealth of the Northern

Mariana Islands.

(16)

The Central District of California.

(17)

The Eastern District of California and the
)

Northern District of California; and the judicial
district established for the State of Nevada.

(18)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Alaska, Idaho (exclusive of Yellowstone
National Park), Montana (exclusive of Yellowstone
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National Park), Oregon, and Washington.

(19)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Colorado, Utah,and Wyoming (including those

portions of Yellowstone National Park situated in the
States of Montana and Idaho).

(20)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Kansas, New Mexico, and Oklahoma.

(21)

The judicial districts established for the

States of Alabama, Florida, ad Georgia and for the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands of
the United States.

(b)

Each United States trustee shall be appointed for

a term of five years.

On the expiration of his term, a

United States trustee shall continue to perform the duties
of his office until his successor is appointed and
qualifies.

(c)

Each United States trustee is subject to removal

by the Attorney General.
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APPENDIX II:

28 United States Code, Section 586

Duties; supervision by Attorney General.

(A)

Eacli united States trustee^ within the region for

which such United States trustee is appointed, shall—

(1)

establish, maintain, and supervise a panel of

private trustees that are eligible and available to
serve as trustees in cases under chapter 7 of title 11;

(2)

serve as and perform the duties of a trustee

in a case under title 11 when reguired under title 11
to serve as trustee in such a case;

(3)

supervise the administration of cases and

trustees in cases under chapter 7, 11, or 13 of title

11 by, whenever the United States trustee considers it
■ to be appropriate—

(A)

monitoring applications for compensation

and reimbursement filed under section 330 of title

11 and, whenever the United States trustee deems

it to be appropriate, filing with the court
comments with respect to any of such applications;

(B)

monitoring plans and disclosure

statements filed in cases under chapter 11 of

title 11 and filing with the court, in connection
with hearings under sections 1125 and 1128 of such
title, comments with respect to such plans and
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disclosure statements;

(C)

laonitoring plans filed under chapters 12

and 13 of title 11 and filing with the court, in
connection with hearings under sections 1224,

1229, 1324, and 1329 of such title, comments with
respect to such plans;

(D)

taking such action as the United States

trustee deems to be appropriate to ensure that all

reports, schedules, and fees required to be filed
under title 11 and this title by the debtor are

properly and timely filed;

(E)

monitoring creditors* committees

appointed under title 11;

(F)

notifying the appropriate United States

attorney of matters which relate to the occurrence

of any action which may constitute a crime under
the laws of the United States and, on the request

of the United States attorney, assisting the
United States attorney in carrying out

prosecutions based on such action;
(G)

monitoring the progress of cases under

title 11 and taking such actions as the United
States trustee deems to be appropriate to prevent

undue delay in such progress; and

(H)

monitoring applications filed under
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section 327 of title 11 and, whenever the United

States trustee deems it to be appropriate, filing
with the court comments with respect to the

approval of such applications;

(4)

deposit or invest under section 345 of title

11 money received as trustee in cases under title 11;

(5)

perform the duties prescribed for the United

States trustee under title 11 and this title, and such
duties consistent with title 11 and this title as the

Attorney General may prescribe; and
(6)

make such reports as the Attorney General

directs.

(b)

If the number of cases under chapter 12 or 13 of

title 11 commenced in a particular region so warrants, the
United States trustee for such region may, subject to the

approval of the Attorney General, appoint one or more
individuals to serve as standing trustee, or designate one
or more assistant United States trustees to serve in cases

under such chapter.

The United States trustee for such

region shall supervise any such individual appointed as
standing trustee in the performance of the duties of
standing trustee.

(c)

Each United States trustee shall be under the

general supervision of the Attorney General, who shall

provide general coordination and assistance to the United
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States trustees.

(d)

The Attorney General shall prescribe by rule

qualifications for membership on the panels established by
United States trustees under paragraph (a)(1) of this

section, and qualifications for appointment under subsection
(b) of this section to serve as standing trustee in cases
under chapter 12 or 13 of title 11.

The Attorney General

may not require that an individual be an attorney in order
to qualify for appointment under subsection (b) of this
section to serve as standing trustee in cases under chapter
12 or 13 of title 11.

(e)(1)

The Attorney General, after consultation

with a United States trustee that has appointed an
individual under subsection (b) of this section to
serve as standing trustee in cases under chapter 12 or
13 of title 11, shall fix—

(A)

a maximum annual compensation for such

individual, not to exceed the annual rate of basic
pay in effect for step 1 of grade GS-16 of the
General Schedule prescribed under section 5332 of
title 5; and

(B)

a percentage fee not to exceed—•

(i)

in the case of a debtor who is not

a family farmer, ten percent; or

(ii)

in the case of a debtor who is a
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family farmer, the sum of
(I)

not to exceed ten percent of

the payments made under the plan of such
debtor, with respect to payments in an
aggregate amount not to exceed $450,000;
and

(II)

three percent of payments

made under the plan of such debtor, with
respect to payments made after the
aggregate amount of payments made under

the plan exceeds $450,000;
based on such maximum annual compensation and the

actual, necessary expenses incurred by such individual
as standing trustee.

(2)

Such individual shall collect such

percentage fee from all payments received by such
individual under plans in the cases under chapter
12 or 13 of title 11 for which such individual

serves as standing trustee.

Such individual shall

pay to the United States trustee, and the United
States trustee shall deposit in the United States
Trustee System Fund-—

(A)

any amount by which the actual

compensation of such individual exceeds 5 per
centum upon all payments received under plans
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in cases under chapter 12 or 13 of title 11
for which such individual serves as standing
;trustee; and'

(B)

■

any amount by which the percentage

for all such cases exceeds—

(i)

such individual's actual

compensation for such cases, as adjusted
under subparagraph (A) of paragraph (1);

(ii)

the actual, necessary

expenses incurred by such individual as

standing trustee in such cases.

Subject

to the approval of the Attorney General,
any or all of the interest earned from
the deposit of payments under plans by
such individual may be utilized to pay

actual, necessary expenses without

regard to the percentage limitation
contained in subparagraph (d)(1)(B) of
this section.
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APPENDIX III:

28 United States Code, Section 589(a)

United States Trustee System Fund

(a)

There is hereby established in the Treasury

of the United States a special fund to be known as the

"United States Trustee System Fund" (hereinafter in
this section referred to as the "Fund").

Monies in the

Fund shall be available to the Attorney General without

fiscal year limitation in such amounts as may be

specified in appropriations Acts for the following

purposes in connection with the operations of United
States trustees—

(1)

salaries and related employee benefits;

(2)

travel and transportation;

(3)

rental of space;

(4)

communication, utilities, and

miscellaneous computer charges;

(5)

security investigations and audits;

(6)

supplies, books, and other materials for

legal research;

(7)

furniture and equipment;

(8)

miscellaneous services, including those

obtained by contract; and

(9)

(b)

printing.

There shall be deposited in the Fund-
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(1)

one-third of the fees collected under

section 1930(a)(1) of this title;
(2)

three-fifths of the fees collected under

section 1930(a)(3) of this title;
(3)

one-half of the fees collected under

section 1930(a)(4) of this title;
(4)

one-half of the fees collected under

section 1930(a)(5);

(5)

all of the fees collected under section

1930(a)(6) of this title;
(6)

three-fourths of the fees collected

under the last sentence of section 1930(a) of this
title; and

(7)

the compensation of trustees received

under section 330(d) of title 11 by the clerks of
the bankruptcy courts.

(c)(1)

Except as provided in paragraph (2),

amounts in the Fund which are not currently needed for

the purposes specified in subsection (a) shall be kept

on deposit or invested in obligations of,or guaranteed
by, the United States.
(2)

On November 1, 1989, and on November 1 of

each year thereafter, the Secretary of the Treasury
shall transfer into the general fund of the Treasury
the amount, if any, in the Fund that exceeds 110
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percent of

(A)

the amount appropriated for the entire

current fiscal year for the purposes specified in
subsection (a), or

(B)

if no appropriation has been made for

the entire current fiscal year, the annual

equivalent of the aggregate amount appropriated to
date for the current fiscal year for the purposes

specified in subsection (a).

(d)(1)

The Attorney General shall transmit to the

Congress, not later than 120 days after the end of each

fiscal year, a detailed report on the amounts deposited
in the Fund and a description of the expenditures made
under this section.

(2)

If for each fiscal year in any period of 2

successive fiscal years—

(A)

the aggregate amount deposited under

subsection (b) in the Fund exceeds 110 percent of

expenditures for the purposes specified in
subsection (a),or

(B)

the costs incurred for the purposes

specified in subsection (a) exceed the aggregate
amount deposited under subsection (b) in the Fund,
then the Attorney General shall include in such

report a recommendation regarding the manner in
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which the fees payable under section 1930(a) of

title 28, United States Code, may be modified to
cause the annual amount deposited in the Fund to

more closely approximate the annual amount
expended from the Fund.

(e)

There are authorized to be appropriated to

the Fund for any fiscal year such sums as may be

necessary toi supplement amounts deposited under

subsection (b) for the purposes specified in subsection
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APPENDIX IV:

28 United States Code, Sections 509 and 510

Qiialifications were established by the Attorney General

(by authority vested in him by 28 United States Code
sections 509 and 510) for membership on panels of private
trustees who are eligible to serve

7 trustees and

as standing trustees in chapter 13.
Section 58.3 of Chapter I of Title 28, Code of Federal
Regulations reads:
Oualifications for Membership on Panels of Private Trustees

(a)

To be eligible for appointment to the panel

and to retain eligibility therefor, an individual must

pbsisess the qualifications described in paragraph (b)
of this section in addition to any other statutory

qualifications.

A corporation or partnership may

qualify as an entity for appointment to the private

panel.

However, each person who, in the opinion of the

United States Trustee or of the Director, performs

duties as trustee on behalf of a corporation or

partnership must individually meet the standards
described in paragraph (b) of this section, except that
each United States Trustee, with the approval of the

Director, shall have the discretion to waive the

applicability of subparagraph (b)(6) of this section as
to any individual in a non-supervisory position.
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No

professional corporation, partnership, or similar

entity organized for the practice of law or accounting
shall be eligible to serve on the panel.

(b)

The qualifications for membership on the

panel are as follows:

(1)

Possess integrity and good moral

character.

(2)

Be physically and mentally able to

satisfactorily perform a trustee's duties.

(3)

Be courteous and accessible to all

parties with reasonable inquiries or comments
about a case for which such individual is serving

as private trustee.
(4)

Be free of prejudices against any

individual, entity, or group of individuals or
entities which would interfere with unbiased

performance of a trustee's duties.
(5)

Not be related by affinity or

consanguinity within the degree of first cousin to
any employee of the Executive Office for United
States Trustees of the Department of Justice, or

to any employee of the office of the United States
Trustee for the district in which he or she is

applying.

(6)(i)

Be a member in good standing of the
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bar of the highest court of a state or of the
District of Columbia;:OR

(ii)
(iii)

Be a certified public accountant; OR
Hold a bachelor's degree from a

full four-year course of study (or the equivalent)
of an accredited college or university (accredited
as described in Part II, § III of Handbook X118

promulgated by the United States Office of
Personnel Management) with a major in a businessrelated field of study or at least 20 semesterhours of business-related courses; or hold a

master's or doctoral degree in a business-related

field of study from a college or university of the
type described above; OR

(iv)

Be a senior law student or candidate

for a master's degree in business administration

recommended by the relevant law school or business
school dean and working under the direct
supervision of:

^

'

(A)

a member of a law school faculty;

(B)

a member of the panel of private

or

trustees; or

(C)

a member of a program established

by the local bar association to provide
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clinical experience to students; OR

(v)

Have equivalent experience as deemed

acceptable by the United States Trustee.
(7)

Be willing to provide reports as

required by the United States Trustee.
(8)

Have submitted an application under

oath, in the form prescribed by the Director, to
the United States Trustee for the District in

which appointment is sought, provided that this
provision may be waived by the United States
Trustee on approval of the Director.
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